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ABSTRACT
Increasingly across the globe, heritage agencies have taken on board the critique of heritage management 
enshrined in Smith’s (2006) argument about the dominance of an ‘authorised heritage discourse’ and the way this 
has been developed by other writers in the field. To this end, they are increasingly engaged in extending their 
work towards working with communities. This is highly commendable and contributes towards the sustainability 
of heritage as a category.
What gets lost in the debates about community engagement and involvement, however, is any consideration of 
the nature or role of the heritage agency as a type of institution; and yet an understanding of the role of these 
institutions in the process is essential if we are truly to break away from limited, top-down, highly managerial 
conceptions of what heritage is for. It is not just a matter of organisations doing what they do in a more inclusive 
manner; it is more than them moving from positions of authority to acting as facilitators. There needs to be a 
clear understanding by all involved in the heritage process – including those who work for institutions – of how 
institutions function in relation to the object of their attention and others who have an interest in that object. 
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21. INTRODUCTION
The question this paper addresses is: what is it that 
efforts to create a sustainable heritage actually 
sustain? Drawing upon work from sociologists, 
anthropologists and others, this paper will outline 
an approach to gaining the necessary insights by an 
examination of heritage bodies as particular types of 
bureaucracy. The object is not to dismiss or denigrate 
the work of heritage bodies but to demonstrate and 
highlight the particular role they play in relation to 
maintaining heritage as a sustainable resource for 
the future. Bureaucracies function in particular ways: 
heritage agencies inevitably also do so. The ultimate 
consequences, which derive from sustaining heritage, 
therefore derive from the work of these bureaucracies 
and we need to understand what they are.  This paper 
is therefore an attempt to consider what institutions 
do when they do their work. I start on the basis of a 
point once made by Michael Foucault: that people 
generally know what they do, and they have a good 
idea why they do it; what they do not know is what 
they do does (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 187).
The same applies to organisations: they know what 
they are for and what they do; they know how they 
work; but they are unaware (possibly because it is 
not really their job to ask) of the results of what they 
do at a larger scale. To take a possible example: the 
police of any country know their job is to prevent and 
combat crime; they know they do that by acquiring 
information on crimes and apprehending criminals; 
but what policing as a practice also does is define a 
category of ‘criminal’, which it then perpetuates by 
treating certain classes of person in particular ways 
and demanding resources to deal with them in those 
ways. It can be argued that criminality is the product 
of policing, not the other way around, but the police 
themselves are unaware of this. 
In a similar vein, earlier work of my own (Carman 
1996: 30-31, drawing upon Schwarz & Thompson 
1990: 91-92) has shown how heritage is not protected 
and preserved because it is valued, but rather that it 
is valued because it is protected and preserved. This 
is in fact how legislation on heritage works: it first 
identifies its object, separating it from all other things 
in the universe; it allocates it to a particular set of 
institutional arrangements for its treatment; and as a 
result that material acquires particular sets of values 
appropriate to its manner of treatment (Carman 
1996). It is not clear to what extent those involved 
in the day-to-day management of heritage realise 
the role they play in this, and it can be argued that 
there is no need for them to do so in order to do their 
job; but if the concern is to go beyond established 
practice, it becomes quite important to know what 
those practices are. 
2. HERITAGE MANAGEMENT AS 
BUREAUCRACY
Heritage agencies of all kinds are necessarily 
bureaucratic bodies. This is not meant pejoratively: 
bureaucracies are particular kinds of institutions that 
have certain characteristics and work in particular 
kinds of ways. They are designed to achieve particular 
kinds of results and do so effectively because of the 
kinds of institutions they are. 
Peter Berger (1973: 202) describes bureaucracies 
as tools to impose “rational controls over the… 
universe”; in this respect, bureaucracy is to the social 
as factory machines are to the material. While factories 
change raw material into something of practical use, 
bureaucracies serve to order the social world and 
make it manageable. They do this through three 
characteristics all bureaucracies share. 
?? The first is termed limited competence (Berger 
1973: 46). A bureaucracy can only deal with 
those things with which it is directly concerned. A 
heritage agency cannot process a claim for social 
welfare payments or a tax claim; but a welfare 
or tax office cannot make decisions about a 
prehistoric monument, even though all represent 
officialdom. In the same way, bureaucracies 
subdivide their own organisation so that different 
aspects of the overall work are undertaken by 
different sections: the parallel is with processes 
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of factory mass production. It is of course highly 
rational to do this: but that reflects the purpose of 
the bureaucracy to impose rational controls on an 
otherwise chaotic universe.
?? The second characteristic is orderliness (Berger 
1973: 50). Previously-agreed sets of criteria 
are applied in all cases so that things are done 
identically. This reflects Mary Douglas’ (1986) 
description of How Institutions Think which is really 
about how individual humans make decisions 
mediated through sets of shared assumptions 
so that agreement is reached even when there 
is evidence to the contrary. An example from the 
world of heritage management is perhaps Startin’s 
(1997) paper on the assessment of archaeological 
field remains in Britain which studied how 
archaeologists had made decisions even without 
clear criteria, and the work discovered that in 
large measure they shared similar approaches: 
while a very positive thing it also demonstrates 
the level of ‘groupthink’ at work in people with 
similar training and shared objectives.
?? The third characteristic is called general and 
autonomous organisability (Berger 1973: 53), 
whereby similar processes are being applied in 
different sections of the organisation by different 
individuals. This is exactly what Startin (1997) 
identified in his work even though he did not call 
it that: it consists of different people in different 
places looking at different things but nonetheless 
applying the same kind of approach to reach 
very similar results. This is a great strength of 
a bureaucracy: that it can achieve this level of 
consistency.
This is what we hope from any organisation: system 
predictability and consistency, leading to “a general 
expectation of justice” (Berger 1973: 52). Because it 
does not matter which individual out of many is doing 
the work of the organisation and making the decisions, 
similar results can be expected to be achieved in 
similar circumstances. This is what Berger (1973: 53) 
calls “moralised anonymity” which is the sum and result 
of all the characteristics of a bureaucracy, and which 
provides protection for the agents of a bureaucracy 
because it does not matter who does what so long as 
they follow the accepted rules.
So what does this mean for those who work for heritage 
bodies? First, consider the purpose of a bureaucracy: 
to impose order, not to act in accordance with a pre-
established order that exists independently. A clear 
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of 
our position is necessary, and they may not be what 
we think. 
3. ISSUES OF VALUE
That ‘value’ is a key issue in relation to heritage is 
widely recognised. What is interesting in the debate 
about heritage value is how little of it is devoted to 
saying what we mean by ‘value’. Our discourse of 
value is in fact highly truncated and collapses to three 
kinds of arguments:
?? about types of value (cultural values versus 
economic values; or lists of uses to which sites 
can be put)
?? about what is being valued (individual objects 
or places, broader categories of heritage object, 
or the purposes heritage serves, all of which are 
different kinds of things); and
?? about how to measure value (usually reduced 
to descriptions of attributes such as age, rarity, 
aesthetic quality, condition and so on).
All of these discourses carry with them a host of 
untested and unquestioned assumptions about the 
nature of value, where it resides and how it relates 
to the thing that is valued. They also tend to be 
‘closed’ arguments: lists are exclusive rather than 
inclusive, and one discourse (e.g. an economic one) 
incorporates no element of another but operates 
entirely independently (and academic papers are 
published in quite separate journals). The result is 
rather than reflecting the complexity of value that we 
all claim to acknowledge, we reduce that complexity 
to a set of separate issues which sit side by side. This 
is institutional (Douglas 1986) or bureaucratic (Berger 
1973) thinking in operation at its least useful. 
While I suspect we all know and recognise that all 
values are ascribed and none are inherent to any 
heritage object, site or place, we do not act upon that 
knowledge; and we allow slippery concepts such as 
4‘authenticity’ to slide by us without too much question. 
The same is true of other concepts which those who 
call for more flexibility (e.g. Thomas 2004) bandy about 
without too much concern for close examination: 
‘community’ is one such (see Smith & Waterton 
2010), and the rise of the ‘stakeholder’ concept (e.g. 
Carman 2005: 83-85) another. A particular issue 
which relates to all of these is the failure to engage 
seriously with issues of ownership (Carman 2005): 
and this is an issue not limited to denying the rights of 
metal detectorists, collectors or others to appropriate 
or damage heritage. It concerns instead an attempt 
to look seriously at how ideas of property infuse our 
own thinking and limit our capacity to act in relation 
to others. Even those who argue for greater public 
engagement by “help[ing] others to engage with 
the past for themselves” require that it can only be 
achieved by “use [of] our own, privileged positions” 
to do this (Thomas 2004: 199): note that we need to 
‘help’ here; our involvement is an actual requirement. 
This claim to ownership of the past – ‘allowing’ others 
access to what remains of our past – is one of the 
many factors impeding our capacity to understand 
what we do does. One of things what we do does is 
to establish, maintain and authorise particular ways of 
approaching the complexities of the universe.
4. DISCOURSES OF SUSTAINABILITY
There are many definitions of the term ‘sustainability’. 
All of them consider sustainability to be a good thing 
and it is primarily a future-oriented concept (see 
examples in table 1). The latter is especially important 
in the light of recent work that specifically addresses 
the issue of ‘futurity’ in heritage practice (Högberg 
et al. 2018), which points out that the heritage field 
has no specific vision of the future for which we work 
and we instead exist in a ‘continuing, rolling present’ 
(Högberg et al. 2018: 6) which takes no account of any 
potential difference of the future from our own time. 
This idea of ‘sustainability’ derives from two different 
disciplinary contexts.
?? As a concept originally deriving from biology 
(e.g. Adams 1990), sustainability represents the 
attempt to create or maintain self-sustaining 
biological systems that will persist through time. 
Plants and animals can be introduced into a space 
and allowed to interact as they would if left entirely 
alone: the result will be a stable ecology where 
cycles of reproduction and predation will result 
in the continuing survival of species. Existing 
ecologies will be managed in such a way that 
the cycle of reproduction and predation already 
established will be allowed to continue and thus 
ensure the survival of species.
?? As a concept adopted by economists and 
development agencies, sustainability means the 
creation of types of new economic activity that – 
by allowing the creation of new wealth – will allow 
a human community and its established way of 
life to continue. ‘Development’ alone has come 
to mean the introduction of new opportunities 
for the creation of wealth regardless of cultural 
factors, that may lead either to rejection of the new 
wealth-creating opportunities or their adoption 
but with significant effects upon the community 
whose well-being they were meant to ensure. 
‘Sustainable development’ means the introduction 
of new wealth-generating opportunities which are 
grounded in local ideology and existing practices, 
allowing the established way of life to continue.
[activity that] meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs 
(Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development [Brundtland Commission] 1987; http://www.
un.org/documents/ga/res/42/ares42-187.htm); 
living and managing activities that balances social, economic, 
environmental and institutional considerations to meet our 
needs and those of future generations (Fraser Basin Council, 
Vancouver, Canada; http://www.fraserbasin.bc.ca/about_us)
a state of organisation… that ensures… an opportunity 
for evolution, not just now but well into the future (Solstice 
Institute; http://www.sustainability.org/index_secondary.
html). 
Table 1.
Definitions of sustainability.
Vitruvio
International 
journal of 
Architecture 
Technology and 
Sustainability
Volume 4 Is 1
5
Figure 1.
Ongoing conservation of fabric at the Athens Acropolis.
What biology and economics have in common is a 
propensity for self-generation. Plants and animals 
reproduce themselves: as individuals die, they leave 
behind offspring; as each generation dies, it leaves 
descendants to carry on the cycle of reproduction and 
predation. Economic activity generates wealth and 
this wealth can be used to finance further economic 
activity: economic activity therefore leads to more 
economic activity. It is this capacity for ongoing and 
continuing activity – both biological and economic 
– that gives the idea of sustainability its meaning in 
these fields. Sustainability here does not mean mere 
survival of discrete entities but the creation of systems 
of activity, and it is the activity which is sustained, the 
system, rather than the individual components. 
The concept of sustainability has spilled out beyond 
biology and economics into other realms. MacFarlane 
(2000: 152; after Rannikko 1999) lists the ‘dimensions’ 
of sustainable development as: ecological 
sustainability; economic sustainability; social 
sustainability; and cultural sustainability. The common 
theme here is that of working in harmony with – rather 
than against – the object of sustainability, whether it 
is a natural ecology, economic wealth creation or a 
human community. Where one or more objects are 
concerned – such as in creating an economic system 
that will conserve biological systems and existing 
lifeways – the task becomes one of combining several 
different imperatives so that they do not conflict (see 
also Sustainable Communities Task Force 1993). In 
similar vein, Selman (2008) argues that the concept 
of ‘sustainable landscape’ contains five elements 
(environmental, economic, social, political and 
aesthetic sustainabilities), although for him these are 
6ranked equally. 
It is evident from these two examples that 
sustainability itself is not a unitary concept, but can 
be subdivided into various kinds of sustainability, 
all of which are required to achieve an overarching 
state of ‘generalised’ sustainability. In considering 
sustainability from a heritage standpoint, therefore, 
we need to do the same. 
5. HERITAGE AS A PROBLEM FOR 
SUSTAINABILITY: MATERIAL AND 
PROCESS
The question that arises is how to envision the idea of 
sustainability in relation to heritage. The name of our 
discipline can be used in two ways: 
?? to represent the material that is the focus of our 
enquiries: the sites, landscapes and artefacts that 
we study and manage (figures 1 and 2); 
?? to represent the practices of heritage in 
understanding and managing the material 
remains of the past: this is heritage as process 
(figure 3).
As material, heritage represents a problem for 
sustainability as conventionally understood. Heritage 
objects do not breed, they do not renew themselves, 
they do not create further heritage, they do not 
generate resources to be used to create new heritage 
sites. Instead the heritage is classically held to be finite 
and non-renewable (e.g. Darvill 1987: 1; McGimsey 
1972: 24). Accordingly, a ‘sustainable heritage’ is a 
problematic category: it is inherently non-sustainable 
if subject to continuous destructive interventions, such 
as the process of excavation of archaeological sites or 
development projects, since once destroyed it cannot 
be remade. Nevertheless, some commentators 
(Carman 1996: 7-8; Holtorf 1998) have argued that 
the heritage is in fact – at least to some degree – 
‘renewable’ and non-finite.  They do so on the basis 
that it is a creation of heritage managers through 
their practices: we are constantly seeking new sites, 
new categories of material, new ways of exploring 
and interpreting the past, and thereby constantly 
increasing the amount of material we can include in 
the heritage. As a body of material, then, heritage 
can be considered to be sustainable so long as the 
process of heritage can be continued.  
It is necessary therefore to decide what we consider 
to be the process of heritage that is amenable to 
sustainability. As practiced across the globe, heritage 
is at once an academic pursuit, a profession, an 
amateur avocation, a public service, a cultural activity, 
an industry, a legal requirement, an entertainment, 
and no doubt a host of other things (see e.g. Carman 
2016). Those we call ‘heritage managers’ do many 
things: they work in museums and other sites, teach, 
write, appear on television, think, advise on policy, 
assess others’ work, and serve as bureaucrats in local 
government and national and international agencies. 
Some do several of these things; others do only one. If 
heritage as a process is to be sustainable, we need to 
consider what will be sustained into the future: 
?? heritage as a concern with the past through its 
material remains? In which case this can be by 
professionals or amateurs: there is presumably no 
need to maintain the present structures of national 
heritage agencies, professional consultants, 
academic departments, and heritage officers in 
government positions; or
?? heritage as a role of government? In which case 
we have no need of amateurs nor perhaps of 
academic departments: heritage training can be 
seen as a purely vocational exercise at the service 
of particular needs; or 
?? Heritage Studies as an academic discipline? In 
which case there will be no need for professionals 
or for involvement in government.
?? or all of them, and others? In which case a 
mechanism for maintaining a diverse range of 
types of heritage work will need to be created.
Whatever the choices we make in answer to these 
options, what will be required for any of these to 
remain viable into the future will be the continued 
presence of material to be classed as heritage. This 
in turn depends upon whether we understand the 
heritage to be finite or renewable.
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Figure 2.
Preserving the fabric at Suwon fortress, South Korea .
6. WHAT IS SUSTAINED BY HERITAGE 
WORK?
So what does this mean for those who work for 
heritage bodies? 
Underpinning so much of what we engage in is 
a discourse of problems and their solution. We 
work on the principle that first you identify and 
define the problem, and from that we then work to 
derive its solution. But this is not the way the world 
actually works. We see this quite often in marketing 
campaigns: all those that offer you marketing or 
delivery of IT ‘solutions’ when you didn’t even know 
they were a problem; and the ‘solution’ offered always 
lies in the area of expertise of the people offering it. 
In other words, the problem is defined in terms of 
its solution, not the other way around. Professional 
consultancies work on the same basis: the ‘solution’ 
they offer is always within the area of their knowledge 
and expertise and it is those terms that they define 
the problem they offer you as requiring solution. This 
realisation that the problem – solution relationship 
is in fact reversed is reflected in the work of Schwarz 
and Thompson (1990: 91-92). Their examination of 
energy policy-making resulted in the realisation that 
"policies are best understood as arguments for ways 
8of life, as rationalisations for different kinds of desired 
social arrangements…. [You] start with a socially 
induced predilection that leads you to favour the sort 
of social arrangements promised by one policy…. 
Having chosen [the policy] you then look around for 
justifications for it."
The same can be said of policy in any field. The 
‘solution’ is derived first, and the problem defined 
to justify that solution. In our case, the solution is a 
continuing role for experts in heritage employed in 
various agencies. Therefore the problem is defined in 
terms of the way others perceive and act towards the 
thing in which we are expert – in our case, heritage. 
Rather than seeking to identify problems which we can 
then ‘solve’, we perhaps should instead accept that 
there are not necessarily any problems in relation to 
heritage, but simply aspects of external reality. There 
are people who really do not care about heritage. 
They have no interest or concern for what we do. If we 
stopped it would not concern them in the least. And 
believe this or not, it is not a crime against humanity to 
think like that! The only people who worry are people 
like us because we have an interest in maintaining the 
particular social arrangements that provide us with 
status and income. People who do not care about 
heritage are a problem for us not because they are 
a danger to the universe, but because we cannot 
‘solve’ them. Hence our concerns for the sustainability 
of heritage, community engagement, stakeholder 
involvement, and the like. 
These serve our purposes and only our purposes. 
Maybe what we do ultimately does is only to offer us 
as a necessary component of social existence.
Figure 3
Preserving heritage practice: ongoing archaeological work in 
Lisbon, Portugal.
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7. CONCLUSION
In short, our work is not about heritage as something 
independent of us that we care for, as we claim: it is 
about making us look important and needed. It seeks 
solutions to problems that only we define, and – lo 
and behold! – those solutions require us to lead on 
them. Our concern for sustainability of the historic 
environment and of heritage practices places us 
centre-stage: we are at once the problem and the 
solution. In other words, what we sustain in our search 
for sustainability is ourselves, our institutions and our 
practices. As so often, our search for sustainability is 
an exercise in trying to find a ‘quick fix’ to issues we – 
and ultimately only we – find troublesome. But there is 
no quick fix: because the problems are not problems, 
merely the kinds of things we find in the world. 
If we are to progress our discussions – about the 
nature of heritage, about how to do our work, about 
how to proceed sustainably – we need to have a clear 
understanding of our place in the world. That means 
a solid understanding of what we do does; and to 
ascertain that requires a solid dose of three combined 
elements: honesty, courage and humility. We need 
honesty to look the world in the face and see it as it 
really is, and us as we really are. We need courage 
because we may not like what we see there. And we 
need humility to recognise that most – if not all – of 
the time the world’s concerns are not about us. If our 
avowed concern with sustainability is really a concern 
for ourselves, then we can at least be honest about it, 
courageous in admitting it to the world, and humble 
in accepting the world’s judgment upon us.
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